The Communist Party
The history of the relationship between the other major political groups and USAFIK is less colorful perhaps than the stormy saga of the People's Republic, but equally significant. The Korean Communist Party which emerged from its underground activities first briefly in mid-August, then again upon the arrival of the Americans, had been one of the least known, most powerful, and best organized of all the parties. Tainted at first by the suspicion of having been subsidized, like the People's Republic, by the Japanese at the end of their regime, they, by their vigorous actions and characteristic singleness of purpose, established a place for themselves among Korean political parties.001001 Interview with Commander G. Z. Williams UBNR, I & H Journal, 13 Oct. 1945.닫기 In the early days, as a party, they did not cause Military Government serious trouble, though small communistic radical groups and small groups of possibly irresponsible members caused the legitimate party to be blamed for many obstructive and violent acts.002002 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.닫기 Also their affiliation with and support of the People's Republic brought them in the way of much criticism as public enemies. After the turn of the year, however, the true extensiveness of their activity and the extent to which they were influenced by non-Korean forces became evident and became increasingly troublesome to USAFIK.
Not until 20 September did G-2 report the name of the head of the one big regular Communist Party, the Korean Communist Party (Chosen Kong San Dang). His name was Pak, Hung Yung.003003 USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, 10 , 20 Sept. 1945, p.4.닫기 The numerical strength of the party was then believed to be about 3,000.004004 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political parties file.닫기 Later, in early January, Mr. Pak said it contained 10,000 south of the 38° and 20,000 north of the line.005005 Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, 5 Jan. 1946, I & H Files. See also CSC 25 March 1946, I & H Journal, where Gen. Hodge stated that Communists own figures showed 20,000 but did not specify how much of Korea this figure included and was only speaking in general terms.닫기 The first signs of admittedly "Communist" activity since the beginning of the occupation began to appear in mid-October when a poster entitled "Communist News" was found in Inch'on dated 15 October, and a handbill entitled "A Manifesto" signed by the Korean Communist Party was found in Seoul on 20 October.006006 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.1. Hereafter referred to as Political Trends.닫기
The Communist groups were loud in their protests against the Korean advisors to Military Government, the interpreters, and against any things which they chose to consider as signs of a continuation of a reactionary tyranny over Korea. They attacked, particularly, the Korean Democratic Party, charging them with being pro-Japanese, reactionary, and traitorous.007007 Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.닫기
The policy of the Korean Communist Party was often obscure, probably because of the efforts of its leaders to appeal to so many factions in the interests of unity and power. On 19 September the "Emancipation Daily News" (Hai Bang Il Bo) published the program of the party which said, in essence, that its aim was to lift up the laboring masses, to fight for the complete independence of the Korean people, and to establish a revolutionary democratic government. It said, also, that the purpose was to build a Communist society with no social strata , graft or oppression. Support of the People's Republic and condemnation of "such reactionary parties as the Korean Democratic Party" was also part of the program according to this paper.008008 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of Emancipation Daily News (Hai Bang Il Bo), 19 Sept. 1945.닫기
Another statement of their aims appeared on 3 October. It included the organization of a free and independent country, a democratic settlement of the land problem, freedom of speech and assembly, the eight-hour day, compulsory education, higher standards of living for all laborers, and the franchise for all men and women.009009 USAFIK, MG, Foreign Affairs Section, Digest of Local Political News #18, 2 Nov. 1945 translation of 3 Oct. 1945 Emancipator.닫기
On 31 October Mr. Pak granted an interview to a representative of the "Korea Free Press." When asked about the question of cooperation with Military Government, he replied:

We must cooperate fully with the American Military Government. Cooperation is only right. Even though protests and explanations may be made in the event of a disagreement with the authorities, none must oppose or clash with Military Government. We must not forget that the U.S. came to wipe out Japanese imperialism and to guarantee Korean liberation.010010 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties file, translation of Interview of Korea Free Press representative with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung on 31 Oct, 1945.닫기

On 1 November Mr. Pak also granted an interview to a representative of Ma Il Sin Bo which was widely publicized. In this interview he expressed himself very vigorously in favor of the occupation and denied having told American press representatives that he favored the immediate withdrawal of American and Russian occupation forces. He was fulsome in his gratitude to the United States and the other Allies for the blood they spilled in the liberation of Korea and said that, until the Korean people practiced a little self-analysis and realized that their present liberty was due to these allies and not to the Koreans in exile, little progress would be made in achieving a united, independent, and democratic Korea.011011 USAFIK G-2, translations of newspapers #187, 1 Nov. 1945.닫기
When Dr. Rhee, Sung Man, through the medium of his Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, attempted to draw the Communist Party into the fold, he found them reluctant. Mr. Pak felt the executive committee of this organization was dominated by reactionary and pro-Japanese members of the Korean Democratic Party and Nationalist Party. Dr. Rhee agreed to eliminate the offending members and the Communist Party joined.012012 USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #54, 3 Nov. 1945, p.3.닫기 A rift soon developed and became so pronounced by the end of November after the arrival of Kim, Koo that Pak withdrew from the Council. At this time Pak, in an interview with a representative of the Korea Free Press on 28 November, said that he believed unity was all-important but that it must be founded on the principles of a progressive democracy. In any case there should be no violence. The government should be formed by gathering the opinions of the whole people, not by a conference of a few political leaders.013013 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of Korea Free Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung on 26 Nov. 1945.닫기
Another indication that the publicly announced policy of the party was comparatively moderate may be found in an undated handbill distributed to Communist Party members in which Pak clarified the official policy. It included the following statement:

There is a rumor current that the Korean Communist Party advocates a proletarian revolution and the establishment of a socialist state. This is a misconception. The Party stands for and always has advocated the foundation of a bourgeois democracy as a necessary step toward full freedom for all classes.014014 USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Information, political parties file, translation of Communist leaflet written by Mr. Pak, Hung Yung.닫기

Naturally the measure of a party's cooperation had to be taken by what it did rather than by what it said, and it was, in the early stages, difficult to determine to what extent the Communists were directly responsible for the highly obstructive acts of the People's Republic with which they were admittedly affiliated, and to what extent they were subject to outside non-Korean influences.
Several events involving the relationship of the Communist Party with the Americans should be considered before leaving the subject. One of these events took place when there was a meeting of the Korean Independence Promoting Central Committee held on 2 November in the Chun Do Kyo. the non-sectarian religious meeting hall where the Democratic Party had held its 16 September meeting.015015 Political Trends #5, 5 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H Journal, 2 Nov. 1945, eye-witness account.닫기 Fifty seven different political factions were present and the five major parties were each represented by their leaders. Dr. Rhee, Sung Man, who had arrived on 16 October from the United States, was chairman and sponsor of the meeting. The hall was heavily guarded both inside and out by MP's and Korean police. Though the meeting was spirited and almost violent, and though there were occasionally shouts and calls from outside the building, Dr. Rhee's prestige was such that the police did not have to be called.016016 Ibid.닫기
The majority of the groups, and particularly Song, Chin Woo, leader of the conservative Korean Democratic Party, were chiefly concerned with drafting a resolution to President Truman, the State Department, Congress, the American people, England, China, and Russia, calling attention to the terrible blunder of the division of Korea at the 38 ° parallel for which they absolved the military commanders from blame but expressed their strong opposition to the blunder of the trusteeship which had been suggested by Mr. John Carter Vincent of the State Department,017017 The Koreans had heard of Vincent's statement made at a banquet of the Foreign-Policy Association in the US. Leaflets had immediately appeared on the streets of Seoul protesting.닫기 and which will be given full treatment in a subsequent chapter on National Issues.
In the midst of this meeting, swarthy, dynamic, Mr. Pak, head of the Korean Communist Party, delivered an impassioned speech insisting that "partition" and "trusteeship" were not serious problems.018018 Ibid.닫기 Although the majority finally adopted the resolution after it had been reworded slightly out of deference to its critics, the Communists Party, at a meeting the next day, decided that the resolution would create a misunderstanding and draw criticism from the Allied Nations, and that it was not a true expression of the will of the Korean people.019019 Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV for Langdon,091654/I Nov. 1945.닫기 Consequently, they prepared a counter-statement which:

... thanked the Allies for the gift of independence, hoping for the eradication of Japanese Imperialists, the impounding of Japanese land, the establishment of a progressive Democratic Government, and the withdrawal of the Allies once such a government is established.020020 Political Trends #6, 9 Nov, 1945.닫기

This resolution was given the same distribution as Dr. Rhee's, much to the latter's annoyance, and signalized the beginning of a widening rift between the Communists and the Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence.
Another occasion when the Korean Communist Party appeared to be cooperating with Military Government was at the famous 23 November meeting of the Korean People's Republic. The more solid wing of the party under the leadership of Pak refrained from plunging with their radical wing brethren into the landslide which defeated the proposal to drop Kook from the name of the organization.021021 Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.닫기 By this restraint they clearly placed the burden of the blame for the defiance on the radical wing. The latter, however, quickly came back into the fold that very night by declaring what they were pleased to call a "developmental dissolution" and joined whole heartedly under Pak to eliminate intra-party strife at a time when the arrival of patriot Kim, Koo made unity seem vital.022022 Political Trends #10, 1 December 1945.닫기
Feeling this strength in unity, Mr. Pak made it quite clear early in December that he would have no further truck with the Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, which in his mind was too full of men who had been collaborators. He also, while protesting support of national political unity, charged the so-called Provisional Government group with failing to respond to his approaches on the issue of unity.023023 Radio TFGBI #81 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 211630/I Dec. 1945.닫기 On 19 December Dr. Rhee struck back by using his regular Wednesday night radio time on JODK to blast the Communists. Though General Hodge had invited him as a non-party man to give a series of non-partisan stabilization speeches to the Korean people, he said:

Communists in Korea are responsible for concocted[concepted] stories, cheating, organized terror. . . They invented the name so-called People's Republic to show the world we are divided among ourselves.024024 Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945, quotation from 19 Dec. 1945 broadcast over JODK, See also Radio TFGCG #180 CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 061644/I Dec. 1945.닫기

Dr. Rhee finally urged all patriots to band together to fight "those people whose work is to destroy and prevent unity."025025 Ibid.닫기
The Communists gave indications of being ready to fight back since it appeared to them that Dr. Rhee had practically declared war.026026 Ibid.닫기 The early press releases on the evening of 28 December, however, which told of the Moscow Conference decisions and indicated that a five-year trusteeship had been decided upon temporarily distracted the parties from a continuation of their mutual name-calling.
The question as to how closely the Korean Communist Party might be controlled from Moscow was of course of concern to the American occupation forces. The answer became increasingly clear to the cammand. General Hodge reported to SCAP on 2 November in part as follows:

Communistic activities are reaching point where they may get beyond control unless positive action is taken. Am sure most radical elements are Russian instigated but cannot get positive proof. Activities are hampering efforts to establish sound Korean economic system. .... Communist propaganda is so insidious and well handled as to have influenced materially the American press. ... The entire activity has the smell of being agitated by a well trained group of outside experts.027027 Radio TFGCG #138, CG USAFIK to SCAP,021403/I Nov. 1945.닫기

He reported again to SCAP on the tenth that Communistic activities were well organized and effective and that they were directed against the efforts of USAFIK to establish an effective government and a sound economy. He said also that he believed communism was backed "by both Soviet and Japanese activities in apparent effort to create chaos."028028 Radio TFGCG #144, CG USAF IK to SCAP, 100927/I Nov. 1945.닫기 There was a strong belief at Corps Headquarters that members of Mr. Alexander Sergeievitch Polyansky's staff at the Soviet consulate in Seoul carried on Communist activities in Korea.029029 Report of the state of Korea by Brig. Gen. William E. Crist, 14-24 Oct, 1945 after inspection trip to Korea. Radio TFGCG #190 CG USAFIK to SCAP 141501/I dated l4 Dec. 1945 says consul confering with local Koreans. Radio TFGBI #63 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 111613/1 Dec. 1945 describes Song, Chin Woo's interview with Polyansky in which latter said the Soviet maintained no liason[liasion] with Korean Communists. This is difficult to accept at face value.닫기 By December the State Department became sufficiently concerned over the possibility of the "existence of directive action inspired from without as against normal political activity" to request General Hodge through CINCAFPAC to send more information on this aspect of the Communist problem in Korea.030030 Radio CiNCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK,030757/Z Dec. 1945.닫기 There was also a belief that Russian Communist literature was being dispensed in Korea south of the 38th parallel by Soviet agencies.031031 Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP,051703/I Dec. 1945.닫기 Pictures of Lenin and Stalin were sold at a memorial service held by radical groups in honor of the Korean martyrs of 1919,032032 Press Conference Report, 9 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.닫기 but the fact that two of the greatest Communist heroes happen to be Russian merely added to the impression of connivance without proving it.
General Hodge, though perfectly convinced in his own mind since early in the occupation found it very difficult to establish a firm proof of extra-political forces pulling the lead strings of the southern Korean Communists.033033 TS Radio C/S USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 131727/1 Sept. 1945.닫기 On 30 November he summarized the situation as follows to SCAP:

Circumstantial evidence indicating possible outside assistance includes the following. (A) Presence of Russian Consul in Seoul. (B) Russian confiscation and withdrawal from circulation for possible use in Southern Korea all Bank of Chosen money in N. Korea and which is valueless except in Southern Korea. (C) Reports that Communists have received funds from outside sources presumably Northern Korea. (D) Reports that three [t]hundred Communist organizers are to be sent from Kanko in Northern Korea to Southern Korea. (E) Internal events show organization and direction beyond the estimated capabilities of local communist leaders.034034 Radio TFGBI #40 CG USAFIK to SCAP,011206/I dated 30 Nov 45. Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP,040813/I, 3 Dec. 1945. Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP,051703/I Dec. 1945.닫기

On 3 December General Hodge sent a radio to SCAP saying that, although he still had no positive documentary proof of outside control and that proof would be difficult to obtain, he felt the evidence justified the conclusion that outside control of Communists in South Korea probably existed.035035 Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP,040813/I dated 3 Dec. 1945.닫기
Communist public utterances certainly offered little help in establishing proof of sinister outside influences because, except for inspiring much of the campaign to palliate the reported atrocities north of 38°, lending generally their approval to the Russian administration, and discrediting U.S. Military Government, there was little said by the Communists which would indicate they advocated anything approaching old-fashioned party line communism of the Comintern type.
The relations of the XXIV Corps with the Communist Party and the popularity of the party itself among Koreans suffered a marked decline when their leader, Mr. Pak, wavered at first on the trusteeship question which came to a climax as a national issue on 30 Deceaber.036036 Radio TFGBI #240, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC 261325/I Mar. 1946. contains criticism of Pak's policy by Inch'on Communist leader.닫기 In a personal interview with General Hodge on 1 January he indicated strong opposition to trusteeship and several Communist newspapers also objected to it. Then he was silent, hesitating to make a public statement.037037 Radio TFGBI #157, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADVON, 251000/I Jan. 1946.닫기 It appeared that he did not dare openly to take a definite stand on either side until he assured himself of the party line.
Instructions were issued on 3 January 1946 by the "Responsible Secretary of the Northern Korea Branch, the Korean Communist Party" to "Responsible Secretaries of ail levels and Branches of the Communist Party" relative to the Moscow Conference decisions. The instructions enjoined all Communists to support in every way those decisions.038038 HUSAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #32, 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.닫기
A leftist parade of 3 January was first called as an anti-trusteeship demonstration then changed a few hours before hand to a pro-Moscow decisions parade.
Coming close on the heels of this evidence of outside influence came the much disputed and publicized 8 January interview between Mr. Pak and Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston of the New York Times. The nimble journalist maneuvered the Communist leader into making a number of statements concerning his support of a plan to sovietize Korea within ten to twenty years and concerning the Communist's preference for a one-power trusteeship under Russia. The fact that these statements were introduced by explanation of what he meant by soviet and were qualified by as insistence on absolute independence for Korea was lost in the general hue and cry which arose.039039 Interview between Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, Leader of Korean Communist Party and Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston of NYT recorded by XXIV Corps PRO and I and K representatives present; I & H Journal. See also TFGBI #190, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 081500/I, dated 7 February 1946.닫기 Although supported by the Korean press, Mr. Pak made his position weaker by trying to deny what he had actually said and by requesting the expulsion of Mr. Johnston.040040 USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #19, p.3, 13-20 Jan. 1946.닫기 There were no grounds for expelling Mr. Johnston for what he did not tell. The statements he did make were verified even by some American eye-witnesses who disagreed with his overall interpretation of the interview. Consequently, Mr. Johnston was officially exonerated by Corps after an investigation and Mr. Pak went into hiding.041041 MG Press Release 18 Feb. 1946, Incl. #1 to USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #156.닫기 His enemies had placed a sum of 300,000 yen on his head.042042 USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Information, OPO, Political Trends", #17, 20 Jan. 1946.닫기
This episode, which alarmed moderate and conservative Koreans as much as it alarmed Corps, was the beginning of the end so far as effective cooperation with the Communists was concerned. Other episodes only added to the cleavage. The refusal of the Communists to have any part in efforts at party cooperation by Colonel M. P. Goodfellow's Korean Representative Democratic Council, the sudden appearance of millions of brand new yen to replenish the dwindling party coffers when the Russian Commission came down from the north,043043 CSC 25 Mar. 1946. I & H Journal. See also radio TFGCG #326 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 181612 Mar. 1946.닫기 and the discovery of letters on the person of at least one American soldier from Mr. Pak to American Communists thanking them for the vociferous sympathy they were arousing in the United States044044 Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC,281623/I Mar. 1946. See also CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.닫기 did little to raise the confidence of General Hodge in the honesty and sincerity of the Communists as an independent Korean political party.045045 CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.닫기 He believed furthermore in March that there was a considerable increase of Communist strength and activity in South Korea, which he reported to SCAP.046046 Radio, TFGCG #326, CG USAFIK to SCAP, I8l6l2/I Mar. 1946.닫기
A further indication of a party unity, which extended at least beyond American occupied Korea into the northern zone, was the discovery of the apparently authentic document of instructions to all Communist leaders in South Korea, which has already been mentioned. The document was found on a Korean and emanated from Northern Korean Communist headquarters. It was dated 2 January 1946 and dealt with the party line attitude on the decisions of the Moscow Conference, but it also prescribed in detail the cheers, slogans, and speeched which were to be made in support of these decisions.047047 USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #32, dated 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.닫기 In addition to this was the lengthening shadow of Kim, Il Sawng, leader of the Communist Party north of 38 degrees, believed to be impersonating the former guerilla leader who had been decorated by Stalin.048048 Radio TFGCG #305 , CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP,231800/I Feb. 1946. See also TFGBI #142, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 191254/I Jan. 1946 and TFGBI #176, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 30I638/I Jan. 1946.닫기 His influence in Southern Korea had nearly eclipsed that of Mr. Pak by early spring.
General Hodge reported the growing strength of the outside influence and the lessening distrust of Russia among Koreans. He said this was evidenced by:

the newly intensified Communist campaign in South Korea and evidences of increasing Communist followings. It is also evidenced by the recent open call-out to the Russian trained and directed Communist by the so-called "leftist" Koreans leaders, who had previously avowed they were not Communists.049049 Radio TFGCG #333, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 022313/I Apr. 1946.닫기

Later still more definite and specific proof of the far reaching tie-ups of the South Korean Communist Party came to hand when a "Communist Unit Journal" was discovered at the Communist Party Headquarters. The journal covered the period from December 1945 to May 1946 and revealed the connections which existed between the leaders of the party and Mr. Lyuh, the Russian delegates on the Joint Commission, the North Korean Communists, American military personnel, and the Soviet Consulate.050050 XXIV Corps G-2 Summary #4l, 23 June 1946.닫기 The relationships between the latter and the Korean Communists was further established by the talkative Soviet vice-consul, Mr. A. I. Shabshin, who admitted to a Korean friend in confidence that he was the controlling leader of all Communists in South Korea and that Mr. Pak was his henchman. 051051 Radio TFGBI #304, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC,130656/Z, June 1946.닫기

註 001
Interview with Commander G. Z. Williams UBNR, I & H Journal, 13 Oct. 1945.
註 002
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.
註 003
USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, 10 , 20 Sept. 1945, p.4.
註 004
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political parties file.
註 005
Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, 5 Jan. 1946, I & H Files. See also CSC 25 March 1946, I & H Journal, where Gen. Hodge stated that Communists own figures showed 20,000 but did not specify how much of Korea this figure included and was only speaking in general terms.
註 006
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.1. Hereafter referred to as Political Trends.
註 007
Political Trends #2, 26 Oct. 1945, p.2.
註 008
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of Emancipation Daily News (Hai Bang Il Bo), 19 Sept. 1945.
註 009
USAFIK, MG, Foreign Affairs Section, Digest of Local Political News #18, 2 Nov. 1945 translation of 3 Oct. 1945 Emancipator.
註 010
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties file, translation of Interview of Korea Free Press representative with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung on 31 Oct, 1945.
註 011
USAFIK G-2, translations of newspapers #187, 1 Nov. 1945.
註 012
USAFIK G-2, Periodic Report #54, 3 Nov. 1945, p.3.
註 013
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Opinion, political parties files, translation of Korea Free Press interview with Mr. Pak, Hung Yung on 26 Nov. 1945.
註 014
USAFIK, MG, Office of Public Information, political parties file, translation of Communist leaflet written by Mr. Pak, Hung Yung.
註 015
Political Trends #5, 5 Nov. 1945, p.1. I & H Journal, 2 Nov. 1945, eye-witness account.
註 016
Ibid.
註 017
The Koreans had heard of Vincent's statement made at a banquet of the Foreign-Policy Association in the US. Leaflets had immediately appeared on the streets of Seoul protesting.
註 018
Ibid.
註 019
Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV for Langdon,091654/I Nov. 1945.
註 020
Political Trends #6, 9 Nov, 1945.
註 021
Political Trends #9, 24 Nov. 1945.
註 022
Political Trends #10, 1 December 1945.
註 023
Radio TFGBI #81 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 211630/I Dec. 1945.
註 024
Political Trends #13, 22 Dec. 1945, quotation from 19 Dec. 1945 broadcast over JODK, See also Radio TFGCG #180 CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 061644/I Dec. 1945.
註 025
Ibid.
註 026
Ibid.
註 027
Radio TFGCG #138, CG USAFIK to SCAP,021403/I Nov. 1945.
註 028
Radio TFGCG #144, CG USAF IK to SCAP, 100927/I Nov. 1945.
註 029
Report of the state of Korea by Brig. Gen. William E. Crist, 14-24 Oct, 1945 after inspection trip to Korea. Radio TFGCG #190 CG USAFIK to SCAP 141501/I dated l4 Dec. 1945 says consul confering with local Koreans. Radio TFGBI #63 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 111613/1 Dec. 1945 describes Song, Chin Woo's interview with Polyansky in which latter said the Soviet maintained no liason[liasion] with Korean Communists. This is difficult to accept at face value.
註 030
Radio CiNCAFPAC ADV to CG USAFIK,030757/Z Dec. 1945.
註 031
Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP,051703/I Dec. 1945.
註 032
Press Conference Report, 9 Nov. 1945, I & H Journal.
註 033
TS Radio C/S USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 131727/1 Sept. 1945.
註 034
Radio TFGBI #40 CG USAFIK to SCAP,011206/I dated 30 Nov 45. Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP,040813/I, 3 Dec. 1945. Radio TFGBI #52 CG USAFIK to SCAP,051703/I Dec. 1945.
註 035
Radio TFGBI #46 CG USAFIK to SCAP,040813/I dated 3 Dec. 1945.
註 036
Radio TFGBI #240, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC 261325/I Mar. 1946. contains criticism of Pak's policy by Inch'on Communist leader.
註 037
Radio TFGBI #157, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADVON, 251000/I Jan. 1946.
註 038
HUSAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #32, 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.
註 039
Interview between Mr. Pak, Hung Yung, Leader of Korean Communist Party and Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston of NYT recorded by XXIV Corps PRO and I and K representatives present; I & H Journal. See also TFGBI #190, CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP, 081500/I, dated 7 February 1946.
註 040
USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #19, p.3, 13-20 Jan. 1946.
註 041
MG Press Release 18 Feb. 1946, Incl. #1 to USAFIK G-2 Periodic Report #156.
註 042
USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Information, OPO, Political Trends", #17, 20 Jan. 1946.
註 043
CSC 25 Mar. 1946. I & H Journal. See also radio TFGCG #326 CG USAFIK to SCAP, 181612 Mar. 1946.
註 044
Radio CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC,281623/I Mar. 1946. See also CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.
註 045
CSC 29 Mar. 1946, I & H Journal.
註 046
Radio, TFGCG #326, CG USAFIK to SCAP, I8l6l2/I Mar. 1946.
註 047
USAFIK G-2 Weekly Summary #32, dated 21 Apr. 1946, Incl. #2.
註 048
Radio TFGCG #305 , CG USAFIK for Benninghoff to SCAP,231800/I Feb. 1946. See also TFGBI #142, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC ADV, 191254/I Jan. 1946 and TFGBI #176, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC, 30I638/I Jan. 1946.
註 049
Radio TFGCG #333, CG USAFIK to SCAP, 022313/I Apr. 1946.
註 050
XXIV Corps G-2 Summary #4l, 23 June 1946.
註 051
Radio TFGBI #304, CG USAFIK to CINCAFPAC,130656/Z, June 1946.